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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the current trends in Chinese outward foreign direct investment since the 
initiation of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative by the Chinese government in 2013. Using both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods this thesis aims to signal the economic motivations of 
resource seeking, market seeking and strategic asset seeking OFDI projects within OBOR and the 
geographic and sectoral distribution of Chinese OFDI projects between 2013 and 2016. When evaluating 
the emergent trend model of Buckley et al (2008) it appears that current OFDI projects of China are 
mostly aimed at seeking efficiency in existing supply chains.  
 
Keywords: Chinese OFDI – One Belt, One Road – Resource seeking FDI – Market seeking FDI – Strategic 
asset seeking FDI – Investment motivation 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
We live in an ever globalizing world. Over the last years there has been a massive increase in 
interconnectivity between countries. Also, the investments into other countries have spiked. “Foreign 
investment volumes have also climbed to more than one-third of world GDP. America’s outbound 
investment has continuously risen to more than $5 trillion in 2013, the same year in which foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows into the United States rose to nearly $3 trillion” (Khanna, 2016, p. 27). 
However, China also is a major contender for outbound FDI. “China is quickly becoming the world’s 
largest cross-border investor as measured by foreign exchange reserves, portfolio capital, and FDI, with 
its total overseas holdings projected to reach $20 trillion by 2020” (Khanna, 2016, p. 29). Nowadays 
more capital is going out of China than comes into it. The reasons named for the rise of Chinese FDI are 
diverse, ranging from exploitation of countries for natural resources to the improvement of trading 
relations. It is interesting to look at the outward foreign direct investments (OFDI) of China because 
these have spiked significantly after further opening up its economy to the world in 1992. Still it does 
raise the question why Chinese companies invest in countries beside its own. This thesis will revolve 
around that question. 
  
1.1. Literature review 
 
The article that is most referred to when talking about Chinese OFDI is the one by Buckley et al titled 
‘The Determinants of Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment’ (2007). They look at Chinese OFDI 
through history and define different trends on why and how Chinese companies invest in certain 
projects. It was one of the first researches conducted that tried to model Chinese OFDI (Buckley et al, 
2007). They published their findings in another article where they deem the most important factors for 
Chinese OFDI to be government involvement, geographic distribution, sectoral distribution and entry 
mode (Buckley et al, 2008). In the same research, next to these factors, they distinguish four different 
motives for FDI based on the earlier research of Dunning (1993): natural-resource seeking FDI, market-
seeking FDI, strategic asset seeking FDI and efficiency seeking FDI, where the latter is incorporated in the 
other three (Buckley et al, 2008). The researchers identify a historic model of outward Chinese FDI and a 
model which they believe the system is going towards (Buckley et al, 2008). In table 1 you can see their 
results. The research can be seen as  Table 1: Trends in Chinese OFDI 
the cornerstone for contemporary research 
on outward investments of Chinese 
companies. When writing on Chinese ways of 
investing outside its own borders there is no 
looking past their research because it was the 
first thorough study on this topic. Still, 
because of the fast developments it’s not 
clear whether the emergent trends of 
Buckley et al are still viable. This criticism is 
two-sided: scientific research-based and 
policy development-based. First the scientific 
hurdles will be elaborated on. 
 Several studies have been conducted seeking an explanation on what drives outward FDI by 
Chinese firms following the research of Buckley et al. Wang et al (2011) for instance sought to test 
different explanations by, next to involving resource based strategy, involving industrial organization 
economics and institutional theory. One of the critiques Wang et al had on the research of Buckley et al 
was the usage of aggregate national-level data on FDI which “does not allow us to understand how firms 
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differ from one another” (Wang et al, 2011, p. 426). Their solution was to use a two-level dataset from 
China to further include industrial and institutional factors, as those were investigated as reasons for 
firms to invest outside the origin country’s borders (Wang et al, 2011). The research of Wang et al 
(2011), however, lacked the broad spectrum which the research of Buckley et al (2007) did cover as it 
only used one explanation from Buckley et al (2008) (resources seeking strategy) as possible explanatory 
force behind Chinese OFDI. Other research focused primarily on China being an emergent market (Luo 
et al, 2009; Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). Kolstad and Wiig (2009) do raise a valid ‘problem’ with the research 
of Buckley et al, stating that they only used data on approved investments rather than actual 
investments. Cai (1999) already had claimed that in the period 1991 till 1999 it is estimated that only 15 
to 20% of actual financial outflows was approved. These comments are valid in the sense that there are 
shortcomings in the research of Buckley et al, but they do not disqualify the research of Buckley et al as 
the most complete and leading article on this topic. The viability is not questioned, as the comments 
mostly cover the points where the methodology could improve but still they use the outcomes of the 
research as starting point. 
The policy development-based critique is more convincing in its way of criticizing the research of 
Buckley et al on its viability. The main objection is in essence very simple: it has been more than ten 
years since the ‘then’ emergent trends in Chinese FDI were researched. That is a really long time for any 
research to be able to hold the same outcome. Nevertheless, the research of Buckley et al was so well 
structured that the conclusion may hold because the research was conducted over a timespan of more 
than ten years (1991-2001). Time itself might therefore not even be the real issue here, but the 
development of Chinese policy towards OFDI is. The amount of Chinese FDI is expected to rise 
spectacularly due to the ‘new’ campaign of ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR), an inclusive word for all 
connectivity projects where China is involved with to revive the old Eurasian Silk Road and the maritime 
trading routes of China to Africa and Europe as will be elaborated on later. President Xi Jinping already 
stated that the future of Chinese OFDI in the coming ten to fifteen years will be focused on 
infrastructure and connectivity projects with OBOR as the umbrella (Summers, 2016). As Ding Xiaoxing, 
Director of Central Asia studies at the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations, said in 
2015: “If before Chinese investment was directed at the oil and gas sector, now it will be in 
infrastructure, industry, agriculture, tourism and other areas” (Farchy, 2015). Within the article of 
Buckley et al connectivity projects are not mentioned at all, while infrastructure is only mentioned once. 
How can a model still predict the underlying economic motives of certain OFDI projects when at the 
time the research was conducted these type of projects were not common?  
As such, it seems  unlikely that the table of emergent trends of Buckley et al still holds after all 
these years. Still, due to the very clear methodology and structure of the article a lot of scholars use this 
as the most trustworthy model to date. This thesis therefore aims to research whether time has 
changed the way we should look at reasons behind Chinese OFDI and whether the model of Buckley et 
al still holds after the introduction of the One Belt One Road initiative. To illustrate what is meant by this 
initiative the next section studies OBOR in depth. As suggested in research (Deng, 2009; Liu, Xiao and 
Huang, 2008), case studies will be used to explore the different types of firms involved in OFDI projects. 
1.2. Defining ‘One Belt, One Road’ 
As mentioned before, the main argument why the model of Buckley et al should be evaluated is the new 
Chinese government initiative called ‘One Belt, One Road’. While the name insinuates a clear and 
delimitated initiative, the opposite is the case. By some dubbed as a purely political propaganda 
offensive, the initiative has far more implications than merely diplomatic (Summers, 2016). However, 
there has been quite some confusion on what encompasses the OBOR project of the Chinese 
government. In this part of the thesis the project will be explained as it will be used in this thesis. At first 
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the chronological timeline of the OBOR initiative shall be elaborated on. After that the full implications 
and projects of OBOR is discussed.  
 Right after assuming office as president, Xi Jinping started to develop the initiative that has 
become his signature foreign policy. Xi first showed his interest in the ‘New Silk Road’ in September of 
2013 when he spoke at the a conference of SCO in Kazakhstan about his proposal to create a ‘Silk Road 
economic belt’ (SREB) (Summers, 2016). The ‘maritime Silk Road’ (MRS) was introduced by Xi and 
premier Li Keqiang at an APEC summit In Indonesia in October of 2013 (Summers, 2016). Xi claimed that 
China should work with their neighbors towards better connectivity. The two terms (SREB and MRS) 
remained rather undetailed for the next year. It was not clear what the economic belt and the maritime 
road encompassed. At the time it seemed just like a set of roads, railways and pipelines along what used 
to be the Silk Road. In March of 2015 it became somewhat clearer when the NDRC, the Ministry of 
Commerce and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs jointly published the Visions and Actions document on 
‘jointly building Silk Road economic belt and 21-st century maritime Silk Road (Greiger, 2016). In this 
document the pillars on which OBOR is based were revealed. China has five main objectives for the 
initiative: coordination of policy, facilitating connectivity, facilitating trade, deepening financial 
integration and increasing people-to-people exchanges (Xinhua, 2015, section IV). The Chinese 
government has mentioned that the OBOR project potentially includes 65 countries and almost 4,5 
billion people (He, 2015).   
 Within the project several ‘corridors’ have been identified. These corridors are the places where 
China wants to focus investments on. The six economic corridors are China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor, 
New Eurasian Land Bridge, China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor, China-Pakistan Corridor, Bangladesh-
China-India-Myanmar Corridor and the Indochina Peninsula Corridor (Greiger, 2016). Later in this thesis 
there will be looked at the existing cases that have begun already under the banner of OBOR. The 
financing mechanisms for the projects of OBOR also have been mentioned by the Chinese government. 
They want to use existing organizations like the SCO, ASEAN, CASCF, FOCAC, World Bank, BRICS Bank, 
IMG and newly founded AIIB to finance the projects (Greiger, 2016).  
 
1.3. Research question and boundaries to the research 
 
The research of Buckley et al was very thorough but with the OBOR-related interest in infrastructure and 
connectivity investments their expectations might be outdated already (Ernst & Young, 2015). This 
thesis aims to research whether the economic motivations for the projects within OBOR overlap with or 
differ from what Buckley et al expects following their research.. This results in the central question of 
this thesis: 
 
What drives the outward foreign direct investment of China since the introduction of One Belt One Road?  
 
This is a broad research question that is not related to the table of Buckley et al, but in the end that is 
the question that will be answered in this thesis. Have the reasons for outward foreign direct 
investments changed for China? In order to review this question this thesis will take the theory of 
Buckley et al as a starting point for research. Their research takes a look into the OFDI behavior of 
Chinese companies. This thesis juxtaposes theory with the empirical data. The Belt and Road initiative 
will come back frequently in this research. The dichotomy between the theory of Buckley et al and the 
statement of Xi Jinping and Ding Xiaoxing that connectivity and infrastructure is getting more and more 
important in the OFDI of China leads to the following operational research question: 
 
To what extent can the emergent trends in the model of Buckley et al still explain the outward foreign 
direct investment behavior of China since the introduction of One Belt One Road? 
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In order to answer this operational research question different methodologies will be used to 
adequately find an answer for the following sub questions that together encompass the full spectrum of 
the model of Buckley et al. 
 
Analysis using quantitative data: 
- What is currently the distribution (geographical and sectoral) of Chinese OFDI projects? 
 
Analysis using qualitative data: 
- What are the entry mode and the government involvement of the cases of OBOR OFDI projects? 
- Wat is the economic motivation for the typical OFDI cases within OBOR?  
 
Together these questions adequately answer the central operational research question. This research 
will give a good overview of the current OFDI projects of China. Also, it will provide a sound analysis on 
why China chooses to invest outside their own borders. The thesis will be divided into several chapters. 
The second chapter will provide the theoretical framework for this thesis. The third chapter will 
elaborate on the methodology and will make the three sub questions researchable by operationalizing 
them. In the fourth chapter the empirical analysis will take place. In this chapter each of the sub 
questions will be answered. The discussion of the research can be found in the fifth chapter of this 
thesis. The final chapter will be the conclusion, combining all the findings of the thesis into a final 
remark. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical framework 
Foreign investors came rushing to China since the opening of China in 1978. Especially after the nanxun 
(southern tour) of Deng Xiaoping in 1992 FDI became a large part of China’s involvement with the world. 
Within thirty years China has now become the second largest economy in the world (Breslin, 2013, p. 
86). Now you see a switch of focus by the Chinese government. At first the focus was on the incoming 
FDI more than on outgoing FDI (OFDI). However, OBOR has sparked a new era of outgoing FDI and 
because of that the OFDI has, for the first time, outstripped incoming FDI in China (Chang, 2014). This 
thesis juxtaposes theory with empirical information. It tries to evaluate the current situation of OFDI 
once more. Buckley et al have done the same in 2008 and their results can be seen in the introduction of 
this thesis. Hereinafter, when talking about their model, there will be referred to the ‘emergent trends’ 
column of those results. At first the content of the model is elaborated on in this chapter. After that the 
conceptual designs of the various hypotheses will be discussed and illustrated. 
2.1. Defining the trends in China’s OFDI 
In this part the model that has been proposed in the article by Buckley et al will be explained. The 
research give seven variables that should be considered when researching Chinese OFDI. Buckley et al 
tell us that in OFDI projects of China they expect a hands off approach of the Chinese government. Also, 
the distribution of OFDI projects would both be centered in developing countries and oriented on 
manufacturing in the years to come. They expected the entry mode of the projects to be wholly owned.  
The final four categories are the strategies for investing outside one’s own country and they need a 
little bit more explaining. Buckley et al defined these four different strategies for OFDI: natural resource-
seeking, market seeking, strategic asset seeking and efficiency seeking. These terms originate from the 
research of Dunning (1993) in his book Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy.  
 Natural resource-seeking means that the investment of firms in other countries than the home 
country they would try to get the natural resources that they cannot get in their own country 
(Dunning, 1993).  
 The market seeking strategy for OFDI encompasses the motives for investing in another country 
by firms in order to broaden their market (Dunning, 1993). Chinese firms are expected to show 
defensive and offensive market seeking behavior according to Buckley et al (2008).  
 Strategic asset seeking OFDI is where firms invest in outside activities to gain knowledge and 
with that a strategic asset (Buckley et al, 2008).  
 The last strategy for OFDI is not mentioned in the table of Buckley et al. That is because 
efficiency seeking OFDI is, in the eyes of Buckley et al, that type of strategy is used to make the 
established resource seeking and market oriented FDI projects more efficient instead of 
standing on its own as a strategy (Buckley et al, 2008).  
Below each of the variables shall be elaborated on in combination with their expected value according 
to Buckley et al. 
 Firstly the geographical and sectoral distribution. The authors expect the geographical 
distribution of OFDI to be dispersed over developing countries (Buckley et al, 2008). As they uncovered 
in their research, the OFDI investments went from mainly aimed at developed countries in 1992 
(69.44%) to mainly aimed at developing countries in 2004 (78.03%) (Buckley et al, 2008, p. 727). This 
trend will continue according to them which means that the outward investments will increasingly focus 
on the developing countries. For this assumption Buckley et al bases themselves on the China 
Commerce Yearbook data which “reports an individual annual stock position for each host country in 
respect of approved Chinese FDI” (Buckley et al, 2008). That data listed all approved OFDI projects, not 
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distinguishing projects by ownership form or industry. Industry is the second variable that was included 
in the table of the authors. Using a different dataset than the China Commerce Yearbook data, namely 
SAFE data, Buckley et al (2008) look at the sectoral distribution of outward Chinese FDI (1991-2001). The 
values they distinguish are Primary, Manufacturing, Tertiary and Other.  In 2001 the sector that was 
represented most in the outward FDI of China was the manufacturing sector. In their emergent trends 
they expect this trend to continue and make manufacturing the biggest sector Chinese companies invest 
in.  
 Secondly the entry mode and government involvement shall be elaborated on. In the past 
Chinese companies have made a habit of attracting a ‘local’ partner when entering a market by creating 
a joint venture (Buckley et al, 2007). This would mean that both the company in the recipient country 
and the Chinese company would have to pay a share of the project. The expectation of Buckley et al is 
that the strategy of Chinese companies to mostly create joint ventures will cease and be replaced by a 
tendency to invest as a wholly owned company where no other company will influence the project. 
When talking about government involvement Buckley et al (2007) believe that, while in the past the 
government had a ‘hands-on’ approach, the expectation for the future is that the Chinese government 
will have ‘hands off’.  
 The next three variables where the emergent trends section of the model has values for are the 
economic objectives of investing in a market seeking-, natural resource seeking-, and strategic asset 
seeking OFDI projects. The first to be discussed is market seeking OFDI strategy. Buckley et al (2008) 
recognize in their research that market size significantly matters as a determinant of FDI flows. When a 
market increases in size, the opportunities for outside parties to profit also increase (UNCTAD, 1998; 
Chakrabarti, 2001). The economic motivation for investing in another country could either be defensive 
defensive (substitute imports) or offensive (develop new markets) (Buckley et al, 2008). Natural 
resource-seeking FDI, according to the research of Dunning (1993), revolves around the search for a vast 
supply of domestically scarce natural resources. Buckley et al (2008) signal that the emergent trend 
would be that Chinese firms try to get raw materials and commodities from other countries (spread over 
developed and developing countries). Strategic asset-seeking FDI “has been directed to the acquisition 
of information and knowledge on how to operate internationally (…) in the recent years an expressed 
goal of state-directed Chinese ODI has been to access advanced proprietary technology, immobile 
strategic assets” (Buckley et al, 2007, p. 505). 
2.2. Conceptual design and hypotheses 
From the model of Buckley et al several hypotheses can be distilled. In this thesis those hypotheses will 
stand at the basis of the research that will be done. The sub questions will help to verify the hypotheses 
and therefore be able to update the model that Buckley et al have come up with almost ten years ago. 
To be able to research the tenability of the model first the variables need to be discussed. The 
independent variable for every dependent variable has got something to do with an Chinese outward 
foreign direct investment. In the conceptual model below all dependent and independent variables can 
be found in relation to what outcome the model of Buckley et al expects to see. Five hypotheses can be 
formulated based on this: 
Hypothesis 1: When Chinese firms invest in projects outside of China the investments will be dispersed 
over developing countries and focused mainly on the manufacturing industry.  
 
Hypothesis 2: If a Chinese firm invests in an industry of another country then the mode of entry will be 
wholly owned and the government will have its hands off.  
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Hypothesis 3: If the outward foreign direct investment of a Chinese firm is natural resource seeking then 
the objective is to retrieve raw materials and commodities. 
Hypothesis 4: If the outward foreign direct investment of a Chinese firm is market seeking then the 
objective is either to substitute imports (defensive) or to develop new markets (offensive). 
Hypothesis 5: If the outward foreign direct investment of a Chinese firm is strategic asset seeking then 
the objective is to obtain foreign technology and to access foreign distribution channels. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology and operationalization 
This thesis is looking for the verification/falsification of the model for outward foreign direct investment 
of China of Buckley et al. As mentioned earlier different methods will be used in order to achieve the 
desired outcome. Below I will briefly highlight what sources I plan to use for each of the sub questions. 
Also I will elaborate on the method of inquiry of every sub question to show why this approach is 
necessary, but also what the limits are of the research because of the choices that have been made.  
 
3.1. Quantitative research 
3.1.1. What is currently the distribution (geographical and sectoral) of Chinese OFDI projects? 
 
To investigate this sub-question, data on the OFDI projects of China is necessary. The data that was used 
in the research of Buckley et al (data from the China’s Commerce Yearbook and SAFE data from the 
Chinese ministry of commerce) is not accessible for this research so therefore different sources of data 
will be used. The public accessible dataset from the American Enterprise Institute’s (AEI) China Global 
Investment Tracker offers a good alternative. The dataset of the American Enterprise Institute’s China 
Global Investment Tracker (combined research with The Heritage Foundation) has kept an eye on all 
investments of Chinese companies outside of China above 100 million dollars from 2005 till 2016 (AEI, 
2016). The dataset has every project lined up with values for the variables ‘Year’, ‘Month’, ‘Chinese 
Entity’, ‘Quantity in Millions’, ‘Share Size’, ‘Transaction Party’, ‘Sector’, ‘Subsector’, ‘Country’ and 
‘Region’. It is the dataset closest to the dataset used by Buckley et al. This thesis aims to identify the 
reasons for China to invest outside of China after the introduction of OBOR. Therefore the data from 
2013 till now will be used to identify the countries China invests in. As for the variable of geographic 
distribution of Chinese OFDI the model of Buckley et al expects that more investment goes to 
developing countries this thesis will try to verify that. The AEI dataset is used to see which countries 
China invests in. The data of the Human Development Index will then be incorporated in the dataset to 
see whether more money is spend in developing countries or developed countries (UNDP, 2016). The 
model of Buckley et al can be verified when the share of investments to lower developed countries is 
higher than the share of investments to higher developed countries. For the second variable of sectoral 
distribution the China Global Investment Tracker dataset is used to conduct an analysis of the statistical 
data on the sector in which China has invested in. The model of Buckley et al is correct when the biggest 
share of investments goes into manufacturing oriented industries.  
 The method of inquiry for this question is a descriptive statistical analysis of the means. This 
method was chosen because it is the most reliable option in the light of  a lack of data. The optimum 
way to find causation in a statistical study would be a regression analysis. That way the effect of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable can be controlled for effects by other variables. 
However, the dataset this thesis uses does not have enough variables in order to successfully control the 
regression analysis on external effects. For that reason there has been chosen to conduct a descriptive 
analysis of the means of two variables. For the first dependent variable of geographical distribution the 
following will be done. First the projects before 2013 will be filtered from the dataset because that is the 
year OBOR was announced. Then the projects are to be divided into development status. The ‘Country’ 
variable has been recoded into a ‘Human Development Status’ variable, dividing the countries into the 
development status category in which the recipient country is situated according to the Human 
Development Index. The value range of the variable ‘Development Status’ ranges from ‘Very high human 
development’, through ‘High human development’ and ‘Medium human development’, to ‘Low human 
development’. A means analysis has to be conducted to see if Chinese companies more often choose to 
invest in countries with a low development status or in countries with a high development status. For 
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the second dependent variable of sectoral distribution the values of variable ‘Sector’ shall be recoded 
into the values ‘Primary’, ‘Manufacturing’, ‘Tertiary’ and ‘Other’ (likewise the division by Buckley et al). 
Again a descriptive analysis of means shall be used as method in order to see what sector was invested 
most in between 2013 and 2016. Unfortunately, not all investments in the dataset have a sector 
appointed to them in which the investment was made. Those will remain empty and therefore the 
descriptive analysis will not be complete. However still enough cases have a value for sector so for 
validity it does not matter. 
The limitation of this approach, as mentioned, lies in the data available. Buckley et al used 
different datasets to come to their conclusions. Therefore the conclusion might not give a 
representative answer to the question. However, it will offer a significant claim that could be further 
tested in future research. 
 
3.2. Qualitative research 
 
Just looking at quantitative data does not give the details necessary to be able to tell what the entry 
mode, government involvement and economic motivations are of certain companies to invest in OBOR 
projects. Press statements, company websites and newspaper articles on OBOR projects have to be 
reviewed and scrutinized in order to provide a foundation for the conclusions given in this thesis. This is 
the first time this thesis significantly differs in approach from the research from Buckley et al. They 
based the emergent trends in the outward foreign direct investment strategies solely on statistical data. 
However, economic motivations for entering certain projects have important nuances which stay 
undisclosed when reducing them to statistical data. In this thesis the objective is to find whether and 
how OBOR projects differ from earlier OFDI projects. A specific set of cases shall be addressed and 
therefore the importance of digging deeper into cases is evident. For that purpose, this research will to a 
lesser extent be able to generalize its outcomes to the entire OFDI project base of China, but it will 
deliver on validity by zooming in on the cases that truly matter for verifying the model of Buckley et al in 
this research. 
The research design for this qualitative part of the thesis is a triple ‘most-likely’ case study, one 
for each type of Chinese OFDI. Each of the ‘strategy-variables’ (natural resource-seeking, market seeking 
and strategic asset seeking) are expected to have another economic motivation behind so therefore 
three different projects are studied in depth. A most-likely case study has as characteristic that it has the 
conditions that make the case “unusually favorable for the theory” (Odell, 2001, p. 166). As a result, 
when disconfirmed, the theory would prove to be invalid (Odell, 2001).  
 Like in most small-n case studies, here the main method of inquiry for the within case analysis is 
process tracing (Odell, 2001).  Process tracing1 is important to get a reconstructed view of events 
through different sources which can be analyzed for the verification/falsification of the theoretical 
paradigm (Gerring, 2007: 173). As a method, process tracing can contribute to evaluating and describing 
political and social developments (Collier, 2011). With process tracing the researcher attempts to trace 
back the links within the possible causal mechanism. Every source at its disposal that could help with 
recreating this chain of events is used in this method (George and Bennett, 2004). One of its features is 
that it can very well be used in hypothesis testing and development, which is exactly what this thesis 
aims to do (George and Bennett, 2004). George and Bennett (2004) make a fitting analogy of fifty 
numbered dominoes to explain the use of process tracing:  
 
                                                 
1 Process tracing is the method that identifies the causal mechanism behind the dependent and independent 
variable relations; ‘the effort to infer causality through the identification of causal mechanisms’ (Mahoney, 2000: 
412). 
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“Suppose that a colleague shows you fifty numbered dominoes standing upright in a straight line with 
their dots facing the same way on the table in a room, but puts a blind in front of the dominoes so that 
only number one and number fifty are visible. She then sends you out of the room and when she calls you 
back in you observe that domino number one and domino number fifty are now lying flat with their tops 
pointing in the same direction; that is, they co-vary. Does this mean that either domino caused the other 
to fall? Not necessarily (…) Tracing the processes that may have led to an outcome helps narrow the list 
of potential causes.” (George and Bennett, 2004, p 173). 
 
In the case of this research the first domino is the investing of Chinese companies in other countries 
while the last domino would encompass the specific projects. An economic motivation is present as 
intervening variable to make the companies invest in specific projects and that is what this research 
attempts to investigate by using process tracing: trace the project process from the initiation stage till 
the status quo at this time to find out the players involved and the economic motivation for the 
investment. By reviewing news articles on the specific cases the process of the case will be uncovered.  
   
3.2.1. How to research the values for the variables? 
 
A third method is used to find the values for the three variables entry mode, government involvement 
and economic motivation. Where an overview of the cases is provided by process tracing using the 
above mentioned sources, the three variables will be found by performing a qualitative analysis of the 
(mostly) primary sources that come forth out of the process tracing. For the entry mode and 
government involvement also news articles are used. For the economic motivation of companies only 
the project and company statements/websites are researched because they reflect the nature of the 
company the best. The most obvious shortcoming here is that the ‘true’ economic motivation might not 
be highlighted by the companies involved. However, statements of companies are in this case the most 
trustworthy source to signal the reasons to invest in a certain project. Below the approach for each of 
the variables shall be elaborated on. 
 From the case overview, which the process tracing provides, the Chinese companies involved 
need to be distinguished. They are the key players in this research. From the sources used in the process 
tracing the value for both the entry mode and government involvement has to be found amongst the 
Chinese companies involved. For the entry mode-variable, the model of Buckley et al expects the 
companies to be mostly wholly owned, instead of a joint venture. The emergent trends column, 
consequently, would be correct when the Chinese companies involved appear to be investing as wholly 
owned entities instead of establishing a joint venture together with a foreign partner. As for the 
government involvement the companies involved shall be scrutinized by looking at their websites to find 
out whether the investment is government driven or not. Company websites will be used, as well as 
news articles to find the broadest picture for every company that is evaluated in this thesis. 
 To find the economic motivation for the three cases that correspond with the natural-resource 
seeking, market-seeking and strategic asset-seeking strategy in the model of Buckley et al the project 
and company statements are researched. According to the model three different expectations can be 
formulated. For the natural resource seeking case the motivation nowadays should be to retrieve raw 
materials and commodities. In the literature there is looked at the reasons for the investment. In case of 
the market-seeking case the model claims it would be because of a defensive (substitute imports) or 
offensive (develop new markets) market seeking strategy. The last case is the strategic asset seeking 
case and here the aim is to find out whether the model is right when it claims those investments are 
aimed at obtaining foreign technology and to access foreign distribution channels. In case of the natural 
resource seeking FDI case study the focus will be on the usage of ‘retrieval of natural resources and 
commodities’ in relation to the project. The focus when investigating the market seeking FDI strategy 
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will be on the companies using a defensive or offensive approach in their project. When the words used 
are not to be considered either defensive or offensive then the emergent trends value for this particular 
strategy does not hold. For the final strategy, strategic asset seeking, OFDI case study there will be 
looked at the words used by the parties involved in order to find out whether the economic motivation 
has to do with obtaining foreign technology or access new distribution channels. 
 
3.2.2. Case selection 
 
As can be seen from the conceptual model (2.2) three case studies are needed in order to verify/falsify 
the hypotheses that are posed by Buckley et al. The research model of Buckley et al uses data from 1991 
to 2001 therefore misses the outgoing FDI projects in the reign of president Xi Jinping. He invests in 
different kind of projects outside of China with OBOR as the most obvious difference. The question 
raised here is whether the model of Buckley et al still holds when considering OBOR projects since that is 
the major focus of the Chinese government for the coming years (Xinhua, 2015). To limit the projects 
that will be studied, this thesis will not look at the maritime road towards Europe. Instead it will look at 
the known existing projects that have been put under the OBOR ‘banner’ at the Silk Route Economic 
Belt. This has been decided because the maritime Silk Road is less developed than the Economic Belt 
(Greiger, 2016). 
This research consists of several hypotheses as previously stated. For the first hypothesis 
quantitative data is required of the outward foreign direct investments of China. This will be further 
explained when talked about in the paragraph on the operationalization of the hypotheses. The 
following four hypotheses will be tested by conducting several case studies. The case studies will all be 
situated in the Silk Route Economic Belt, because of the frontrunner status of those projects. The 
Financial Times distinguishes nine different projects that have been named to have a connection to the 
Belt and Road initiative (Farchy et al, 2016): Moscow-Kazan high-speed railway,  Khorgos-Aktau railway, 
Central Asia-China gas pipeline, Central Asia-China gas pipeline (line D), China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan 
railway, Khorgos Gateway, Trans-Asian railways, Rail connection to Tehran and the China-Pakistan 
highway. 
From these projects the case studies will be chosen as these are known ‘One Belt, One Road-
projects’. As can be seen from the conceptual model this thesis will conduct three case studies. Each will 
be a typical case of a particular type of foreign direct investment identified by Buckley et al. For the 
natural resource seeking FDI project the project that has a clear connection to natural resources shall be 
used. In this case the Central Asia-China gas pipeline (line D) can be seen as the most typical. The 
identification of key players in the process of constructing the pipeline is important for finding an 
answer to the second sub-question and therefore this case was selected. The second type of OFDI 
identified by the model is market seeking FDI. Here the most evident case of market seeking FDI is 
selected: the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (Highway) (CPEC). The CPEC is selected because of the 
stage in which it is situated right now. At the moment several deals have already been closed on the 
matter which, again, makes it a good case to study in depth. The last case mentioned in the model of 
Buckley et al is the strategic asset seeking foreign direct investment. For this the case of the Khorgos 
Gateway shall be used as it is a strategically located project on the border of Kazakhstan and China 
meant for attracting more investments.  
With using these cases there cannot be claimed that this thesis copies the research of Buckley et 
al. Their research was bases solely on statistical data. Using case studies instead of conducting a 
statistical analysis will give a clearer image of the economic motivations of the OBOR projects and gives 
an indication whether the emergent trend section from the Buckley et al model still are the emergent 
trends when talking about OBOR projects. The reasons for using these specific projects for case studies 
are simple. Firstly they all are, what you can call, ‘pilot-projects’ for the One Belt, One Road initiative. 
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There is a consensus these projects fit into the picture of OBOR (Farchy et al, 2016). Secondly, they are 
considered to be high profile projects so enough data can be found to conduct a proper case study 
(Farchy et al, 2016).  
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Chapter 4: Empirical analysis 
 
4.1. Quantitative analysis 
 
4.1.1. Geographic distribution 
 
As mentioned in the methodology section of this question a descriptive analysis of the means has been 
done in order to find the value for geographic distribution. For this two variables are necessary: 
‘Quantity in Millions’ and ‘Human Development’. The question that has to be answered here is whether 
Chinese companies invest more when a country is less developed. This statement, as claimed by Buckley 
et al, can be looked at from two different angles. The first possibility is looking at the actual amount of 
investments that have been done by Chinese firms into other countries after the introduction of OBOR 
in 2013. The second possibility is the cumulative sum of investments made into other countries per 
value for Human Development after 2013. Either way the development status of the countries in which 
Chinese companies invested have to be distinguished. The division per development status can be seen 
in the HDI report of 2016 (UNDP, 2016).  
After conducting the statistical analysis of the means as presented in Table 2 interesting remarks 
can be made looking at the data. The first notable fact is that since 2013 Chinese companies have made 
investments outside of China’s borders over 1200 times accumulating approximately 792.480 million 
dollars of spending. Interestingly, looking at the data, the companies have invested more in developed 
countries than in lower developed countries (375.060 million versus 109.380 million dollars). Another 
trend that can be seen when looking at the table is that the amount of investments outside of China 
slowly grows, from 90 in 2013 to 184 in 2016. This increase is not stemming from an increased number 
of  investments in lower developed countries (which has decreased from 50 in 2013 to 29 in 2016), but 
more due to the increasing amount of investments in more developed countries (90 in 2013 to 184 in 
2016).  
 
Table 2:Investments per development status (2013-2016) 
 
 
4.1.2. Sectoral distribution 
 
The next variable to be researched is the sectoral distribution of the OFDI projects of China after the 
introduction of OBOR. The most important thing to mention here, again, is that cases will be missing in 
the dataset because there is no value for the sector in the dataset. The N for this analysis is not 1217, 
like the geographic distribution dataset had, but 924 cases. Amongst the cases in the dataset the values 
for sectors are: agriculture, chemicals, energy, entertainment, metals, real estate, technology, tourism, 
utilities and other. When dividing them into the four basic sectors primary, manufacturing, tertiary and 
other, there is turned to the research of Zoltan Kenessey (1987). He made a division between the 
sectors and identified the fourth economic sector, by Buckley et al called ‘other’, but mostly is referred 
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to as service and financial sector. In Appendix 1 a table of the division that was made by Kenessey can 
be found. 
 When looking at this division and the sectors mentioned in the dataset available it becomes 
clear what sector should be recoded under which category mentioned by Buckley et al. In the ‘primary’ 
category the agriculture sector shall be recoded to. The ‘manufacturing’ category, chemicals, energy and 
metals shall be recoded to. The third category, ‘tertiary’, shall have the projects of entertainment, 
technology and tourism.  The final category of ‘other’ types will consist of real estate, utilities and other. 
When conducting a statistical analysis of the means the results are as projected in Table 3. 
 The main claim the data offers is that the tertiary sector and other sectors both grow (31 to 63 
investments and 60 to 81 investments) while the primary and manufacturing sector stay relatively stable 
(9 to 13 investments and 103 to 113 investments). However, the total sum of investments declines even 
in the manufacturing sector. Even though that is true, the most investments In the last four years still 
were in the manufacturing sector as almost half the investments were in that sector (413 of the total 
924 investments). 
 
Table 3: Investments by sector (2013-2016) 
 
 
4.2. Qualitative analysis 
 
4.2.1. Case study 1: Central Asia pipeline D 
 
One of the first projects to be distinguished as an OBOR project is the Central Asia – China pipeline D. 
Part of a larger initiative, pipeline D is a multilateral project between companies from several countries 
like Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. While pipeline D first was mentioned in 2013, 
the Central Asia – China gas pipeline was initiated in 2006, long before OBOR was even mentioned (Ling, 
2014). In order to understand the full picture this case study encompasses the entire Central Asia- China 
pipeline. The most important pipeline here, however, is D, because the other parts of the pipeline were 
constructed before OBOR was announced.  
 The Central Asia-China pipeline consists of four major pipelines, indicated by the first four letters 
of the alphabet (A, B, C, D). Pipelines A, B and C run from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan towards Xinjiang province in China (Ling, 2014). The first time the gas pipeline was 
mentioned at all was in August of 2004 when China Daily reported on the discussing of Kazakhstan and 
China on a pipeline that would bring gas to China (China Daily, 2004). The demand for natural gas was 
increasing at the time in China due to its desire for high economic growth and the want to replace oil 
and coal consumption with gas “to reduce its heavy reliance on oil imports, and improve the 
environment by burning less coal” (China Daily, 2004). At that time it was mentioned that later 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan possibly would join the discussions to create a ‘pan-Asia pipeline’ (China 
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Daily, 2004). In 2006 the word came that the Turkmen President Niyazov signed an initiative that would 
allow the pipeline to expand towards Turkmenistan (Kimmage, 2006). The idea behind the pipeline was 
that China would buy 30 million cubic meters of Turkmen gas every year, starting in 2009 (Kimmage, 
2006). Next to that China also had to pay for the construction costs (BBC, 2007) For Turkmenistan it also 
was a way to become less dependent on the Russian gas imports. On July 18, 2007, the production-
sharing agreement between the Turkmen State Agency for the Supervision and Use of Oil and Gas 
Resources and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed the agreement to start the 
construction of pipeline A from Turkmenistan, through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, towards China (BBC, 
2007). In Kazakhstan the company that would be involved with the pipeline was KazMunaiGas, as was 
announced in November of 2007 (Golovnina, 2007). In 2009 pipeline A was opened by president Hu 
Jintao of China (Gurt, 2009). A new pipeline project (pipeline B) between Kazakhstan and China was 
signed in 2010 to expand the existing pipeline by a new 1,400 kilometers long pipeline to strengthen the 
natural resource ties between the countries (Zhihong, 2010). The final construction of the trinity of 
pipeline projects under the Central Asia-China pipeline, pipeline C, commenced in Uzbekistan in March 
of 2012 (Pipelines International, 2012). For this pipeline the gas supply started in January of 2014. This 
previous paragraph serves as a summary of the projects before the construction of pipeline D, which is a 
project under the OBOR banner.  
 The fourth pipeline did not have Khorgos at the end of the line, but the city of Wuqia. Also, for 
pipeline D two new countries came to join the Central Asia-China pipeline. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan also 
wanted to profit from the gas export of Turkmenistan to China so they agreed to let the pipeline 
through their lands. The fourth and final (planned) pipeline is expected to raise the export capacity of 
gas from Turkmenistan to China by more than a third (55bn to 85bn cu m per year) (Farchy and Kynge, 
2016). With the pipeline CNPC  wanted to import more natural gas towards China. In 2014 China and 
Tajikistan agreed to start the construction of pipeline D (Song, 2014). According to the CNPC the initial 
talks had begun in November of 2011 but only in 2014 the Chinese government had given its accord 
when Xi Jinping visited Central Asia in September of that year (Song, 2014; CNPC, 2014). The pre-
feasibility study for the pipeline had then be completed and was signed by China’s National 
Development and Reform Commission (Song, 2014). China and Tajikistan signed a deal beforehand to 
establish a joint venture that would build pipeline D (Song, 2014). The final signature was signed 
between CNPC’s subsidiary Trans-Asia Gas Pipeline Company Limited and Tajiktransgaz on March 4, 
2014 (CNPC, 2014).  
In conclusion, pipeline D is a joint project between several gas companies from different countries. As 
can be seen in table 4 a joint venture was established in order to complete the project. When finished 
the Central Asia-China gas pipeline network will be the largest gas transmission system in Central Asia. 
Everything in this project is aiming to get more gas from Central Asia towards China (CNPC, 2014). As 
motivation for the project the CNPC gives the following explanation: 
 
“The pipeline project is recognized as a model of sincere solidarity and mutually beneficial cooperation 
between China and concerned Central Asian countries. The inflow of Central Asian gas will significantly 
help China in meeting its energy demands and improve the nation's energy consumption mix. Also, the 
project will help the Central Asian countries diversify their energy exports, and promote socio-economic 
development in the region” (CNPC, 2014). 
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Table 4: Overview of the Central Asia-China pipelines   
 
 
4.2.2. Case study 2: China Pakistan Economic Corridor 
 
The second case study to be researched includes the infrastructure projects under the China Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC). While China already invested in Pakistan, the new initiative of CPEC makes it 
able for China to profit even more from the Pakistani lands (BBC, 2015). In this part of the thesis firstly 
the CPEC will be explained. Secondly the projects that already have started under the CPEC will be 
discussed in a similar fashion as happened with the previous case study. 
The China Pakistan Economic Corridor is often seen as a pilot project under OBOR (CPEC, 2017). 
It includes transport and energy projects across Pakistan with at its end a major deep-sea port that lies 
directly next to the Indian Ocean (BBC, 2015). In May of 2013 Chinese Premier Li Keqiang initiated the 
CPEC when visiting Pakistan. In July of the same year a Memorandum of Understanding was signed 
between China and Pakistan when Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan visited China (CPEC, 2017). It 
emphasized the desire to eventually work towards the completion of CPEC. To ensure the construction 
of the CPEC a Joint Cooperation Committee was set up by China and Pakistan that safeguards the 
construction process (CPEC, 2017). Five different working groups fall under the JCC: long-term planning, 
energy, transportation infrastructure, industrial cooperation and Gwadar port (CPEC, 2017). In this 
section there will mainly be looked at the transportation infrastructure because those are the projects 
that fit under the market seeking FDI which is researched by this case study.   
 Until now six different projects have been initiated by CPEC, but only three are under 
construction or completed (CPEC, 2017). The first project worth discussing is the Joint Feasibility Study 
for Upgradation of ML1 and Establishment of Havelian Dry port done by China Railway. It is the first 
CPEC infrastructure project that has been completed (CPEC, 2017). The second project focused on in this 
thesis is the 120 km KKH PhaseII (Havelian- Thakot Section) which is under construction as we speak 
(CPEC 2017). This project is conducted by the China Road and Bridge Corporation. The last infrastructure 
project that is being discussed here is also a project which is under construction. It is the 396 km 
Karachi-Lahore Motorway (Sukkur-Multan Section) and it is conducted by the China State Construction 
Engineering Corporation Limited (CSCEC) (CPEC, 2017). They signed the contract with a contract value of 
US$2.89 billion on December 22, 2015 (CSCEC, 2015). CSCEC has to build  “bi-directional 6-lane 
motorway with the overall length of 392 km and at the design speed of 120 km/h” within 36 months, 
according to the press release at the time (CSCEC, 2015). The objective is to “greatly improve the local 
transport conditions of the most populous and developed regions in Pakistan, promote local economic 
development and play a positive role in the interconnection between China and Pakistan” (CSCEC, 
2015).   
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4.2.3. Case study 3: Khorgos Gateway 
 
The third case study is a typical case of a strategic asset FDI project. Like the Chinese investments in the 
Piraeus Port is a strategic asset investment for the maritime silk route, the Khorgos Gateway (or Khorgos 
Eastern Gate) in Kazakhstan is strategically placed as hub for the silk road economic belt. Khorgos 
Gateway is a dry port placed on the border of China and Kazakhstan. It is supposedly the key cargo hub 
for the silk road economic belt (Farchy and Kynge, 2016). Major investor in the Gateway is Chinese 
Jiangsu Province that has agreed to invest over $600 million in five years in order to build logistics and 
industrial zones around Khorgos (Farchy and Kynge, 2016).  
Just like the pipelines through Kazakhstan that were initiated with a visit of president Xi to 
Kazakhstan in 2003, the Khorgos Gateway, too was first discussed during that visit (Kaczmarski, 2015).  It 
is seen as the starting point of the Silk Road Economic Belt and therefore of vital importance to the 
Chinese strategy towards the West (Kaczmarski, 2015). The Khorgos Gateway is part of the Special 
Economic Zone and that is what makes it a strategic asset seeking FDI. The idea is to make from Khorgos 
Dry Port a hub that could be considered ‘the new Dubai’ (Oborwatch, 2016). Plans have been made to 
create more than 40,000 jobs within twenty years’ time (Oborwatch, 2016). In picture 1 you are able to 
see what kind of projects are happening in the area of the Khorgos Dry Port. An airport, train station, 
industrial zone and a highway that goes right through the place are part of the idea.              Picture 1:                             
The main operator of the port is 
KTZE-Khorgos Gateway LLP 
Company (Khorgos Gateway, 
2017).  
 China is not the only one 
investing in Khorgos Gateway. It is 
a joint project between Kazakh 
and Chinese investors. Next to 
Jiangsu Province of China, also the 
state railway company Kazakhstan 
Temir Zholy (KTZ) has invested 900 
million dollar into the dry port 
(Farchy, 2015). The stakes for 
Kazakhstan are pretty high since in 
2015 98% of the trade between China and Europe                               Source: Oborwatch (2016)                                       
went over sea (Farchy, 2015). They hope more trade will happen over land so Kazakh companies can 
profit from the increased activity. And while the costs of containers travelling by train is higher than 
travelling by sea, the time it takes to get to Europe over land is significantly lower and therefore cheaper 
(14 days versus one month) (Farchy, 2015).  
On their own website the Khorgos Gateway uses the following statement to motivate the 
development for the Gateway: “Efficiently developed infrastructure of the project favors the 
development of trade and economic relations between the East and the West. Also, new logistic 
solutions significantly decrease the costs in the ‘supply chain’ and accelerate the delivery term on the 
world market” (Khorgos Gateway, 2017).  
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
 
This research gives food for thought when thinking about how and why Chinese companies invest 
outside of China. As was aimed by this thesis the impact of OBOR on the way Chinese companies invest 
was researched. However, some remarks have to be made on the validity of the research. 
Firstly, while the model of Buckley et al was leading throughout the thesis, there has to be said 
that their research was not duplicated here and therefore this research does not replace theirs. They 
had more reliable data at hand and used a solely quantitative approach. However, this thesis does not 
aim for replacing the research done by them, it aims for adding to the conclusion of Buckley et al by 
incorporating One Belt, One Road projects in the model to give a more accurate overview of the Chinese 
OFDI projects nowadays. This study adds to the literature in the sense that it shows from case studies 
that the way of doing foreign direct investments has changed because of OBOR. Future quantitative 
research should point out whether this change shines through all OFDI projects of China. 
The second remark that can be made regarding the method of researching the OFDI behavior of 
Chinese company through the use of case studies. It gives a good overview on how the current OFDI 
projects are structure, but it does not give enough data to be able to generalize the entire outcome. This 
research can be used in future quantitative research on the economic motivation of Chinese 
investments outside of China. Then again, it has to be mentioned that a language barrier was present in 
evaluating the case studies. That has been  limiting factor when conducting this research (only English 
texts have been used). When using Chinese, Kazakh and Pakistani news articles the results may have 
been different. Still this research does offer a solid base upon which future research can be conducted. 
Lastly, in this research there has not been made a distinction between Chinese government 
owned companies and Chinese privately owned companies investing in other countries. This is because 
when just using privately owned companies the cases of OBOR related OFDI projects are limited at the 
moment. Since it is a government initiative it is quite logical that more Chinese government owned 
companies invest first before privately owned companies start to invest. This has no consequences for 
the variables except possibly the entry mode and the government involvements. Since almost all 
investments in One Belt, One Road are also efficiency seeking, next to being pilot investments, the 
preferred mode of entry for those project is a joint venture because of the experience the local 
companies have. Also since they are mostly pilot projects on assignment of the Chinese government 
there will definitely be a hands-on approach by the Chinese government. This does not mean that this 
research does not give a proper values of today’s Chinese investments. As mentioned the coming years 
the investments in OBOR will spark even more so while it may not be representable for all Chinese OFDI 
around the world it does offer a good indication what to expect in the case of investments in OBOR.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
In this conclusion the variables of the model of Buckley et al will be discussed whether they hold after 
doing the research in this thesis. 
 The first variable that was tested was the geographic distribution of Chinese OFDI. The 
hypotheses following the emergent trends model suggested that in the years after the introduction of 
One Belt One Road the countries Chinese companies would invest in would still be dispersed between 
the less developed countries in the world. Quite the opposite is true, the amount of investments 
(amount and cumulative amount in dollars) have basically stayed the same throughout the years 2013 
till 2016. The real difference can be seen in the investments going into countries with a very high score 
on the HDI index. The amount of investments in highly developed countries has doubled on a yearly 
basis looking at 2016 versus 2013. The only statistic in favor of the assumption of Buckley et al that more 
investments would be in lesser developed countries, is that the average amount of money per 
investment was higher in the case of an investment in the least developed countries. A conclusion that 
can be reached, based on the data, is that it is likely that future Chinese investments will be in higher 
developed countries because they are more represented in One Belt, One Road projects. As such this 
part of hypothesis 1 has been falsified. 
 The second variable is the sectoral distribution of Chinese OFDI. As was expected by the 
research of Buckley et al, nowadays the sector most invested in, based on the data at hand, is indeed 
the manufacturing sector. In both the average height of investment and most frequently sector invested 
in this emergent trend proved to still be correct. As such this part of hypothesis 1 has been verified. 
 The third and fourth variables will be discussed together as they appear to correlate in the 
research conducted in this thesis. In the case studies both government involvement and entry mode  
seemed similar in all cases. The entry mode was, in all cases, a joint venture instead of wholly owned. 
Interestingly in all cases investigated they were mostly government bodies or state owned enterprises 
doing the investments. In the case of the Khorgos Gateway it was Jiangsu province who did the 
investment. Looking at the central Asia pipeline D, CNPC (a state owned company) oversaw the projects. 
The emergent trend that Buckley et al suggested that the investments would mostly be conducted by 
companies which were wholly owned and where the Chinese government would have their hands off, 
seems, based on the data used, not to hold in the case of projects under the name of One Belt, One 
Road.  As such hypothesis 2 does not hold and is rejected. 
 The following three variables all are about the economic motivation of OFDI projects. When 
evaluating the natural resource seeking OFDI project the aim with the construction of Pipeline D was 
indeed the retrieval of natural resources. The economic motivation has not changed for this strategy. 
However, for the market-seeking strategy OFDI project (CPEC), the emergent trend proves not to be 
right. The economic motivation had nothing to do with substituting import tariffs or develop new 
markets. The companies involved were more focused on efficient use of infrastructure to include local 
villages into the market. The economic motivation for a strategic asset seeking OFDI would be to obtain 
foreign technology or to access new distribution channels. The main objective for this project was to 
lower the cost for the supply chain as can be seen in the third case study. Of course another economic 
motivation for the project was the attraction for foreign investors in the region. This however is not 
equal to accessing new distribution channels. All case studies did have an element of the emergent 
trends from the model in the motivation for the projects, but in essence for every case study the most 
important reason for the project appears to be efficiency. One could say that One Belt, One Road 
projects seek efficiency in order to get more activity across the Silk Road Economic Belt if the economic 
motivations for the case studies could be generalized. As such hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 can all be rejected 
because the most important reason for each of the projects was different than expected by Buckley et 
al. 
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 Overall the model of Buckley et al could use some updating. Especially the geographical 
distribution, entry mode and government involvement seem not to equal the ‘emergent trend’ expected 
by them. They did predict the right outcome on the sectoral distribution. The economic motivations of 
OFDI projects do not match the expectations from their research. However, because qualitative research 
was conducted instead of quantitative the results cannot be generalized to all OFDI projects of China. 
More quantitative research needs to be done in order to know that is the case. What can be stated 
based on these results is that Chinese investments after the introduction of OBOR do seem to be 
seeking efficiency rather than something else.  
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Appendix  
 
1. Sectoral distribution 
 
Primary Activities: 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing, mining 
Secondary Activities: 
Construction, manufacturing 
Tertiary activities: 
Transportation, electric, gas and sanitary services, wholesale trade, retail trade 
Quaternary activities: 
Finance, insurance, and real estate, services 
(Kenessey, 1987) 
 
